Three expcriments investigated assumptions of the process{.issociation procedure for separating consciously conEolled and automatic inffuenccs of memory. Conditions that encouraged dkect rctrieval rcvealcd process dissociations. Manipulating ancntion during study or manipulating study time affcctcd recollection but left automatic influences of memory rclatively invarianL Howcver, paradoxical dissociations werc found when conditions encouraged usc of a gcneratc--rccognize stratcgy, violating assumptions underlying the estimation proccdurc. Usc of subjcctivc rcports to gain estimatcs produced parallel results. Easity obscrved corrclations arc shown to bc not useful for testing assumptions underlying the processdissocation procedure. A multinomial model produced rcsults that agrce with those from the proccssdissociation approach.
The processdissociation procedure (Jacoby, l99l; Jacoby, Toth, & Yonelinas, 1993) was introduced as a general method for separating the contributions of consciously controlled processes, such as rccollection, from those of unconscious or automatic uses of memory. The procedure builds on findings of dissociations between performance on direct and indirect tests of memory (for a rcview, see Roediger & McDermott, 193) . However, rather than identifying recollection and automatic influences of memory with performance on direct and indirect tests, rcspectively, the procedure is designed to separatc the within-task contributions of the two bases for rcsponding. For example, Jacoby et al. (1993) used the process-dissociation procedure to show that recall cued with word stems, a dircct rcst of memory, involves not only recollection but also rcflects automatic influences of memory or implicit memory of the sort measured by using stem-completion performance as irn indirect test of memory.
There has been a great deal of controversy surrounding the assumptions underlying the process-dissociation procedure (e.g., Curran & Hintzman, 1995; Graf & Komatsu, 1994; Joordens & Merikle, 1993) . The evolution of a theory or methodology is to unveil its assumptions and to come up with ways to test them directly. In the absence of dkect rcsts, evaluation of the new approach must lie in its success in leading to expcriments that uncover new empirical facts along with replicable empirical relations. An equally important component in the evolution of a theory or methodology is the discovery of boundary conditions for its applicability. The existence ofboundary conditions does not mean that the approach should be discarded entirely. That is, one should not advocate abandoning analysis of variance (ANOVA) just because the variances across conditions are sometimes not homogeneous or the scorcs are sometimes not normally distributed. Indeed, advances occur when such boundary conditions are discovered. Establishment of boundary conditions allows one to avoid inappropriate application of the procedurc.
Ofcourse, as a new approach receives extensive criticisnu therc is a tendency to simply abandon the approach, although that is not what critics of the approach intended. Against abandoning the process-dissociation approach, the experiments rcported here replicated findings offered as support for the approach and identified boundary conditions for those findings. Yet, problems for the processdissociation approach remain. Those remaining problems arc discussed in the broader context of othcr approaches that share the goal of separating the contributions of different forms or uses of memory to performance of a task.
The Process-Dissociation Procedure :
Underlying Assumptions An experiment done by Jacoby et al. (1993, Experiment lb) illustrated the process-dissociation procedure. They examined effects of full versus divided attention during study on recall cued with word stems (e.g., mot_for motel). For an inclusion rest, participants were instnrcted to use the stem as a cue to recall an old word or, if they could not do so, to complete the stem with the first word that came to mind. For an exclusion test, participants were instructed to use the stem as a cue to recall an old word but not to use recalled words to complete the stems. That is, participants were instnrcted to exclude old words and to complete stems only with unrecalled words. For both inclusion and exclusion tess, participants werc correctly informed that many of the stems could be completed only with new words and, so, should be completed with the first word that came to mind' Completion rates for stems corresponding to new words served as an index of base rate against which automatic influences of memory rcsulting from study were measured.
An inclusion test is like a standard test of cued recall with instmctions to guess when unable to recollect. People could complete a stem with an old word cither because they recoilected the studied word, with a probability of R, or because the old word came automatically to mind, with a probability of A. If these two bases of responding are inAcpenaCnt" then inclusion performancc "q94t R + ARl{. For the exclusion test, in contrast' participans would complete a stcm with an old word only if the word came auto-matically to mind without recollection of its prior prescntation: A(l -R) -| -Rll. The differcnce between ihc inclusion and exclusion tests pmvides an cstimate of the probability of recollection: R : Inclusion -Exclusion.
-Givcn that cstimate, one can compute the probability of an old word automatically coming to mind: A : Exclusion/ (l -R).
Using these equations, Jacoby et d. (1993) showed that dividing attention during study rcduccd R (.25 vs. .00) but left A almost invariant (.47 vs' .46) . That is, the estimates showed a prccess dissociation similar to thc task dissociations found betwecn direct and indirect memory tcsts (Koriat & Fcuerstein, L976; Parkin, Reid, & Russo, 1990) . That dissociation providcs support for the independencc assumP tion underlying the processdissociation procedurc by showing that a manipulation traditionally identified with cognitive control selectively affects the cstimate of consciously controlled prooesses. Similar process dissociations have been found in several other experiments (for a rcview, scc Jacoby, Yonelinas, & Jennings' 197) .
In addition to the independence assumption, the cstimation proccdure rests on the assumption that R is cqual for th.e incluiion and exclusion tests. It is also assumed that A is cqual for the two types of test. To assess automatic influences of memory Jacoby et al. (1993) comparedA with the base rate of completing stems corrcsponding to new words (.46 vs. .35) and found a significant difference. [t was important that base rates did not differ significantly across the inclusion and exclusion tests or across the manipulation of full versus divided attcntion. As described later, differences in base rates can reflect the violation of assumptions underlying the process-dissociation procedure.
Generate-Recognize Versus Direct Retrieval :
Boundary Conditions for Independence Details of test instructions porcntially serve as an important boundary condition for finding prooess dissociations' The instnrctions used by Jacoby et d. (1993) were meant to encourage participans to retrieve directly earlier-studie'd words, using word stems as cues. To satisfy assumptions underlying the process-dissociation procedure' they required particiirants to exclude old words only on the basis of rccollection. Jacoby et al. noted that use of a generaterecognize sfttegy serves as an alternative means of excluding -ota words and that participants' reliance. on such a .6t"gy would violate assumptions underlying the equations used in their estimation procedure. Exclusion on the basis of a generatFrecognize strategy refers to cases in which an old w6rd automatically comet to mind as a completion for a stenL without being recollected, but is then subjected to a voluntary, recognition-memory check and withheld because it is recognizcd as old (cf. Jacoby & Hollingshead, 1990) ' Suppose instnrctions for the inclusion test were changed such ifiat participants were asked to complete stems with the fint worA that came to mind. This clnnge would make the inclusion test cquivalent to an indircct test of mcmory and, potcntially, climinate intentional use of memory-recollecion. If performance on the inclusion test with changed instructions (indirect test) reflcct€d only automatic influenccs of memory the change would eliminate the effect of manipulations, such as full versus divided attention, that sclcchvely influence recollection. Further, suppose that exclusiortcst instnrctions werc changed by telling participants !o usc recognition memory to avoid completing stems with old words. This change in exclusion instnrctions would incr€ase the likelihood of participants successfully excluding old words because recognition of a word as old is gJnerally easier than is rccalling the word. The change in instructions would also influence base-rate performance' Becausc of falsc recognition, words that were not earlier studicd would sometimes be mistakenly excluded and, so, basc rate for the exclusion test would be lower than for the inclusion test.
The changes in inclusion and exclusion instnrctions are such that thJinclusion test would now measurc the probability of a study word being generated as a completion, whercas the exclusion tcst would measurc the success of a generaterecognize strategy as a means of excluding old words' Participants' rcliancc on a generate'*ecognize strategy would violate the assumptions underlying the equations used by Jacoby et al. (1993) to estimate R andA. Rather than R being cquivalent for the inclusion and exclusion tests, recollection wbdd not be used for either of the types of test and recognition would be important only for the cxclusion test' fire lndepcndence assumption would also be violated' A word muJt be generated before it can be recognized, and so conscious memory would not be independent of automatic influences of memory involved in generating a completion' Paradoxical Dissociations and Correlations as Tests of IndePendence Curran and Hintzman (1995) examined recal| performance cued with word stems and obtained results that they interprcted as showing that participants' reliance on a leneratedecognize strategy, along with correlation between fro"etses at the level of items, invalidated the independence assumption underlying the process-dissociation procedure' Ttrey manipularcd study duration and found what they termed a paradoxical dis sociation between R and A. Increasing study time produced an increase in R but a decrease in A' Cunan and Hintzman aryued that this was because violation of the independence assumption resulted in A being underestimated by pn amount that increased with the magnitude.of R. The diisociation is paradoxical because experiments with indircct tests of memory have shown that manipulating study time leaves performance unchanged (Greene, 1986; Jacoby & Dallas, l98l) . Consequently, increasing study time would be expecrcd to incrcase R and leave A relatively invariant-the same fonn of pnocess dissociation produced by manipulating full venus divided attention during snldy' -Significant correlations betwecn R and A were found by Cunan and Hintzman (1995) and treated as "dilect evidence" of violation of the independence assumption underlying the process-dissociation procedurc' Thcy questioned wf,ethcr assumptions werc satisfied in cadier cxpcriments with the procesidissociation procedurc and advocarcd the use of corrclations to directly test the independence assurnP tion in future experimens. Thc Curran and Hintzman (1995) article was followed by debarc aboUt factors responsible for the paradoxical dissociation that they obyryed and their use of iorrelation to diagnose violation of the independence assumption (Curran & Hintzman,1997; Hintzman & Curran, tggZ; Jacoby, Begg, & Toth, 1997; Jacoby & Sbrout 1997) . Jacoby and Shrout (1997) provided a psychometric analysis of effecs of violations of independencc on correlationi between R and A and argued that the correlations rcported by Curran and Hintzman did not speak to the independence assumption underlying the proccssdissociation procedure. More is said about this when the rcsults of Experiment I are rcPorted.
Experiment I
ln Experiment I, we manipulated instmctions and examined the-effects of full venus divided attention during sody on stem-cued recall. Direct-retrieval instntctions, similar to instructions used by Jacoby ct al. (1993) , werc cxpected to produce results showing that dividing attention reduced R but left A relatively invariant' rcplicating rcsults rcported by Jacoby et al. Generate-recogu?E instnrctions, used in a ,*oni condition, werc expected to produce a very different pattern of results. As compared with dircct-rctrieval instmctions, gencrate-recognize instnrctions werc expected to producJ poorer performance on the inclusion test but to increase the accuracy ofexclusion pcrformance' Reliance on a generate-recognize strategy, makes recollection irrelevant foi ttt" inclusion test but makes rccognition-memory performance important for exclusion performanrce'-Base rates were set to be sufficiently high to avoid zero scoresontheexclusiontestinthedirect.retrievalcondition and were not expected to differ across inclusion--exclusion tests in that condition. (For a discussion of the importance of avoiding zero scores for the exclusion test" see Jacoby, Begg' A fotfr] 1997, along with the rcsponse by Cunan.& Hintzman, 1997)' However, for the generate-recogruze condition, base rate was expected to be lower for the exclusion than for the inclusion test. Further, a paradoxical dissociation was expected in the generate-recognize condition--dividing attention was expected to decrease R but to increase A. Higher recognition-memory performance after full attention, as compared with divided attention, would produce a larger increase in accuracy in exclusion performance and, thereby, produce a larger artifactual decrease inA.
Correlations between R and A were computed to examine empirically Curran and Hintzman's (1995) claims about thc utility of conelations for detecting violations of the independencl assumption underlying the processdissociation procedure. Jacobyand Shrout's (199?) psychometric analysis led us to expeci significant corrclations betwcen R and A cven in the direct-rerieval condition. It is not tmly legitimarc to examine correlatiorrs between R and A in the generaterecognize condition. If estimates are invalid because of violitions of assumptions underlying the estimation procedurc, corrclations between the estimates are not meaningful' However, such correlations wer€ computcd for purposes of comparisons with those from Curran and Hintzman's Experirn"oi 5, their only experiment using an inclusion+xclusion procedure that showed a paradoxical dissociation when zcro icores for the exclusion test were rcmoved. As is shown later, results from that experiment are similar to those from the generate-recoguze condition.
Method
Participants. Ninety-six participants, 60 from the Univcnity of Tcxas at eustin and 36 from McMastcr Univcrsity, participaad in thc expcriment in return for credit in an intnoductory psychology .oon". il"lf of tbc participants were randomly assigned to tttc direct-rctrieval tcst condition, and thc othcr half werc assigncd to thc generatc--rccognizc test condition. An additional 8 participantswcrl testcd, but thcir results werc not used for purposcs of analyscs. TWo of thosc participants werc unablcto do thc dividedatt"ntioo task, and the remaining 6 participants had zcro scorcs in the cxclusion task. Thosc having zcro scores werc all from thc gcncratc-rccognizc condition' and 5 of thc 6 zcro scores were for ivords studied undcr conditions of full attcntion. Participants were tesrcd individuallY.
Materials and design Words uscd in the cxperimcnt compriscd a pool of l4l fivc-lencr nouns of low, mcdiurn" and higb i*qu"n"y as indcxed by Thorndike and Lorgg (19'14) ' Matcrials ur.if i" tiris cxpcrimcnt" along with thosc uscd in Experimcnts 2 and 3, appcar in Appcndix A. One hundred and twcnty of thcsc words werc divided into threc sets of 4O words cach' Acroas formats. sets of words were rotated through the threc studypresentation conditions: full anention, divided attention, and ncw inot studied). Each of the sets was divided furthcr into two scts of iO woras each, which were rotated through the two test conditions: inclusion and cxclusion. This arrangement resulted in 6 formats (3 frcsentation conditions x 2 test conditions). Subsets ofwords had 'an equa distribution of word frequency (M : 343, range : 33-'6 to fO.Z), set size (the number of fiveletter word completions for the stem; t = 3.8, range : 3.7 to 3.9), and base rate. (On the basis of f.""ioot sodies uiing the same matcrials, the probability of completing stems in each subset with the target solution when ncw had i mean of .44 and ranged from '437 to .448.)
To avoid primacy and rccency effects, we Prcsented 5 itcms at the bcginning and another 5 items at the end of both the full-attJntion and divided-anention study lists. These buffer itcms stayed constant across all formats. This resulted in two study lists of 50 words each (,10 critical and l0 buffer items). The dividedattcntion study list was always prcsented prior to the full-anention study list.
The test list consisted of 120 three-letter word stems corrcsponding to the,f0 full-anention study words,40 divided-attention study words, and 4O new words. Each of the 3-lener word stems was unique within the experiment but not within the language. That is, cach stem could be complercd with morc than one 5-letter word but only one of the completions appearcd within the expcriment (e.g., ner-; merc!, mcrge, merit, end merry). For cach word typc (i.c., full attcntion, dividcd attcntion, and new), half of the word stems were prescntcd in the inclusion-tcst condition, and half wcrc prescntcd in the cxclusion-tcst condition. For thc direct-rctricval tcst condition, thc inclusion-and cxclusion-tcst trials wcrc intcrmixcd to producc onc tcst list of 120 itcms. For the gcncratorccognizc tcst condition, thc inclusion-and cxclusion-tcst trials were blockcd rc that there were two 6Gitcm tcst lists.l The cxclusion tcst was always prcscntcd first A short practicc list of 5 itcms was prescntcd prior to the bcginning of each tcst list" For thc direct-reficval condition, tbc practicc consistcd of 3 inclusion-test itcms with I full-arcntion, I dividcd-attcntion, and I ncw tcst itcm; and 2 exclusion-tcst itcms with I fuU-attention and I dividcdattcntion itcm. For tbc generato<ecognizc conditioo, thcre was a practicc beforc cach tcst block and thesc practicc lists consistcd of I full-attcntion itcm, I dividcd-aficntion itcm, and 3 ncw itcms. [n all phascs of the cxpcrimcnt ordcr of prescntation was random witb thc rcstriction that not more than 3 itcms representing the same combination of conditions could bc prescnted in a row.
Thc lisrcning task uscd in thc divided-attcntion condition was onc previously uscd by Craik (1982) . In this task, participana moniOred a tapc-rccordcd list of digits to dctcct target scqucnccs of tbrcc odd (as opposcd to cvcn) numbcrs in a row (e.g.,9, 3,7).1\e digits wcre random, with thc cxccption that a minimum of onc number and a maximum of fivc numbcn occurrcd bcnvccn thc end of onc tsrget scqucncc and the bcginning of the ncxt targct scqucnoc. Digits wcrc recordcd at a 1.5-s rate.
Prccedurc. Words werc prescntcd and responses wcre collcctcd on a PC-compatiblc computcr intcrfaccd with a VGA+olor monior by using Schncidcr's (1990) Micro-Expcrimcntal l-aboratory (MEL; Vcrsion 1.0) software systcm. The charactcr sizc of the stimuli was apprcximatcly 3 X 5 mm. Words wcre prescntcd in whitc lcucrs on a black background in lowcrcasc lctrcrs in the ccntcr ofthc screcn.
For both study lists, words wcrc gcscntcd on the computcr screen, onc word at a timc. Thc words appeared for 1.5 s followcd by 0.5 s of blank screcn. For thc full-attcntion list participants wcre instnrctcd to read thc words aloud and to remcmber tbcm for a later mcmory tcsL For thc dividcd-attcntion list (prescntcd fint), participants werc told that thcy wae to do two tasks at the samc time: a listcning task and a rcading task. They wcrc informcd that it was vcry important not to miss a target scquenoe in the listcning task. Participants responded in the listening task by prcssing a key whenever thcy detectcd a targct scquencc. They were informed that whilc doing the listcning task thcy would bc presenrcd with a list of words that they wcrc to read aloud. However, they were cautioned not to allow the rcading of the words to disrupt their performance on the listening task.
ln the final phase of the cxperimenl word stems consisting of the initial ttuce lettcrs of a word followed by two dashes werc prcsenrcd one stem at a time on thc computer screen. Directrctrieval and gcnerate+ecognizc instnrctions are prcsented in Appendix B. In the direct-rctrieval test condition, cach word stcm was prcceded by the presentation of either the prompt oA or the prompt ncw ccntcred two lines above the word stem in capital leners. The prompt was presented 500 ms prior to the presentation of the word stem and remained on the screen with the word stem until the participant rcsponded or until the deadline of 15 s elapsed. Participants were told to use the word stems as cues for recall of words that had been presented in either of the study lists they had rcad. However, they were informed that recall of a prcviously prcscnted word would not always be possible because some of the word stems could only bc completed with words that had not been presented in the study lists. For a word stem presented with the prompt ol4 participants werc told to use a recalled word as a completion, Howcvcr, for a word stem prcscnted with the prompt ncw, tbey werp told not to use a recalled word as a completion. Rathcr, they were to complete the word stem with a word different fr,om tbc recdled word. Whcn unable to recall a studied word, they wcrc told that they should complete the stcm with thc first S-lettcr word that came to mind, regardless olwhether the stem was accompanicd by the prompt oA or thc prompt new. Although participants wcrc told to completc as many word stcms as possible, thcy were remindcd that it was important to usc recalled words to complctc word stems accompanied by the p'rompt old and not to usc rccalled words to complctc word stems accompanied by the prcmpt ncw. lf they could not think of an sltcrnativc to a recalled word to complctc a stem for an cxclusion rcst, participants were told that thcy should leave the word stem incomplcte.
For the gcncrato+ecognize test condition, word stems wcrc prescntcd withont prompts, and the inclusion and exclusion tcst itcms wcre blockcd to crcate separate tcst lists. Participants wcrc informcd Out their task was to complctc word stems and that some of the stcms could only be completcd by new words. [n the cxclusion tcst condition, the participants wcrc informed that we wcrc intcrcstcd in sccing whether pcople could avoid using the carlicr-prcscntcd strdy words as complction words. Thcrcforc, they wcrc to chcck cach complction word that came to mind, bcfore grving it as a rcsponsc, to bc ccrtain that it was Dot 8n carlicrprescntcd word. If the word sccmed at all familiar, they werc not to givc it as I rcsponsc but, rather, wcr€ to think of an alternative completion. If thcy could not think of an altcrnative completion, tbcy wcre told to leave thc stcm incomplctc and wait for the l5-s dcadline to clapsc. [n the inclusion condition, the participants werc informcd that for this tcst, wc wcrc intcrcsrcd in seeing how quickly thcy could complcrc the stem without worrying about whcther thcir complction words wcre prescnted carlier. They werc told not to try to usc mcmory bccausc it would slow thcm down but o simply give thc first 5-lcttcr complction word that came to mind that fit the stcm and to do so as rapidly as possible.
For dl tests, participants wcrc told that completion words werc to be fvc leucrs long and that no plurals or proper namcs were lExperiment I confounded the manipulation of instructions with a diffcrcncc in tcst order. For the direct-rctrieval condition. inclusion and cxclusion tcsts wer€ intennixed in the same wav as donc by Jacoby ct al. (1993) . For the generate,-recognize condition, in contrast, the cxclusion test preceded the inclusion test. A preliminary cxpcriment combined generate--recognizc instructions with intermixcd tests. Results from the few participants tested in that cxperiment suggesrcd that participants were hesitant to adopt a gencrate-recognize shtegy. L,arge differences in base rate were not prcsent, and A was relatively invariant across the mailpulation of attention. Separating inclusion and exclusion tests was done to producc a morie dramatic difference betrveen the direct-rctrieval and generate-recognize conditions. Experiment 3 intermixed inclusion and exclusion tests for both conditions so that the only differcnce benveen conditions was created by manipulating instmctions.
allowed. If the participant's response met these criteri4 we pressed a key to remove the word stem from the screen and then pressed another key to present the next trial. Otherwise, participants were informed of their error and were told to attcmpt to give a satisfactory completion for the word stem. If the word stem had not been completed after the allotted time, a becp sounded, the screen cleared, and wc initiated the next trial.
Statisrtcal analyses. There werc two main scts of analyscs carried out on thc data for this cxperiment. For cach participant' we calculated the proportion of stems completcd with the target solution in cach Instnrction x Tcst X Study Condition. We pcrformedANOVAs on thcsc data ss wcll as on cstimatcs of R and I OerlvcO from thcsc data To comPutc corrclations, we calculatcd cstimatcs of A for ncw words in thc sasre way as done by Curran and Hintzrran (1995) . Basc rate for thc cxclusion tcst was subtractcd from basc ratc for the inclusion test to cstimatc the probability of falsc rccollcction (FR). Thc basc ratc for the lxclusion tcst was thcn dividcd by I -FR to estimate A for new itcms. For all ANOVAS and power analyscs, alpha was sct to .05 unlcss othcrn isc notcd.
Results and Discussion
In the divided-attention condition, the probability of failing to detcct a target sequenoe for the listening task was .12 forthc direct-rctrieval condition and.l3 forthe generaterccognize condition.
Pruportion of stems completed with oA words. Performance on the inclusion test (Table 1 ) was higher in the direct-retrieval test condition than in the generate+ecognize test condition, F(1,94) : 5.58, MSE : 0.019, and was higher after full attention than after divided attention to study, F(1,94) = 16.41, MSE : 0.009. Although the interaction of instnrction and attention was not significant' the advantage produced by full attention during study was numerically larger in the direct-rctrieval condition than in the generate-recognizn condition. For the exclusion test, participants were less likely to mistakenly use an old word as a completion in the generate-recognize test condition, as compared with direct retrieval, F(1, 94) : 64'83, MSE : 0.033. Exclusion performance was also more accurate after full attention to study, as compared with divided attention, F(1,94) : 35.79, MSE : 0.013. In the direct-retrieval condition, the difference in baseline completion rates for the inclusion and exclusion tests did not approach significance, F < 1. However, in the generate-recognize condition, base rate was much lower for the exclusion test than for the inclusion test, F(I, 47) : 43.0t, MSE = 0.013' The overall pattern of results shows the expected differcnces between direct-retrieval and generate*ec ogmze sftlegies.
Estimates of R and A. The probability of recollection (fablc 2) was higher in the generate+ecognizn test condition than in the direct-retrieval test condition, F(1, 94) = 26.05, MSE: 0.049. This rcsult was cxpected becausc for the generate-recogltze condition, R does not truly measure rccollection but, rather, measurcs recognition memory of words that were generated as a completion. For both test conditions, R was higher after full attention than after divided attention to study, F(1,94) = 44.85, MSE = O.UEThe analysis of A rcvealed a significant interaction between study and test conditions, F(1, 94) = 7.91, MSE': 0.012. Results from the direct-rctrieval condition showed a process dissociation that replicated results rcported by Jacoby et al. (1993, Experiment 1b) . Dividing attention during study produced a decrcase in R, F(l'47) : 19.57, MSE : 0.029, but left A almost perfectly invariant' F < 1. This result did not reflect insensitivity of our measure because the power to detcct an effect on A as large as that observed in the generate-recogruze condition was .99 (Cohen's d = 0.83). Estimates of A for old items werc significantly above base rate, F(I,47) = 32.24, MSE = 0.008' 'bData -points simulated from recollect and exclude data. Table 2 Estinates of Recollection and Automaticity (Frcm Panicipant Means) recognize instructions were used but were not found with direit-retrieval instmctions. Next" we tum to the question of whether correlations between R andA can be used to directly test assumptions underlying the process-dissociation procedure.
Violations of the independenc e as sumption : Diagnostic ity of correlations. Curran and Hintzman (1995) reported ctnehtions between R and A that they interpreted as direct evidence that the independence assumption underlying the processdissociation procedure had been violated' In rerpont", Jacoby and Shrout (1997) provide{ a psychometric anatysis of effects of violations of independence on corrclationi between R and A. That analysis distinguishes between pnocess dependcnce and aggregarton bias' Process depen-'den"" r"tuitt when participants rely of,a strategy ttrat makes conscious memory dependent on automatic influenccs of memory such as ageneratHocognzs strategy. Aggrcgation bias can rcsult when parameters are estimarcd by aggregar ing across participant or item dat4 and estimates are co:rrelarcd "f th" 1"""t across which data werc aggregated' Both process dependence and aggregation bias rcflect a co.rclition that cannot be directly observed but only imagined. This is tnre because it is necessary to aggegate across something, cither participants or items, to compute corrclations.
In a postscript" Jacoby and Shrout (1997) summarized the exchange withCurran and Hintzman (Curran & Hintzman, 199?: frintzman & Curran, 1997; Jacoby, Begg, & Toth, 199?) as having reached agr€ement that observed correlations of R and i calculated by aggrcgating over participants or items cannot be used to provide evidence of process dependence. However, disagteement "boot F."
use of those correlations as evidence for aggregation bias was unresolved.
Corrclation at a particular level will bias estimates only if one aggrcgates across the level at which the correlation exists-6eforc computing estimates. As a commonplace example of why aggregation is necessary to bias estimates, heighi and weight are corrclarcd across people' However, thal correlation does not mcan that when measuring the height or weight of an individual, one has to worry that the -ei"orc on the one dimension is biased by the value on the other dimension. Similarly, we estimated R and A for each participant, and so, corrclation at the level of participants is not a source of bias for estimates. Curran and Hintzman (195) used the observed, positive correlation of R and A at the item level to infer that the unobservable correlation at the participant-item level, across which scores are aggregated to compute participantJevel estimates, was also positive. However, Jacoby and Shrout (lgg7) argued that one cannot make clear inferences about the unobiervable correlation responsible for aggregation bias on the basis of correlations observed at ther item or participant level. This is because correlations are between estimates, and one source of correlations is the estimation procedure itself. Recall that the estimates make use of probabilities of rcporting an old word in the inclusion-test "nA tn" exclusion-test conditions. The nonlinear dependence of estimates of R and A on the same two empirical facs showing a large cffect of study on automatic influences of memory.
A paradoxical dissociation was found in the generaterecognizc condition. Dividing attention decrcased R' F(l' 47)-= 20.8, MSE : 0.O22, and had the opposite effect of increasing A, F(1, 47) : 20'94, MSE = 0'010' For words s$died under full attcntion, A was significantly below bascline, F(1,47') : 13.26, MSE :0'008' which, as noted by Curran and Hintzman (195) , is a certain sign that the assumptions underlying the estimation proccdure were viohtcd. Farticipants' relianc€ on a Senerate{ecognize smtegy produccd a paradoxical dissociation by violating both theinaepenaence assumption and the assumption of equality of R for inclusion and exclusion tcsts.
The rcsults of Experiment 1 showed that the process dissociation rcported by Jacoby et al. (193) is replicable when direct-retrieval instmctions are used. Using similar instmctions, Schminer-Edgecombe (1996, Experiment l) independently rcplicated rcsults rcported by Jacoby et al' Her rcsults showed that A was unchanged by full venus divided anention (.25 and .25), although R was reduced by dividing attention (.28 vs. .09). Base rates were the same for inclusiJn and exclusion tests (.17 and .17)' Of the 32 participans in her experimenl 3 participants produced zero 'ota ,uotat in the exclusion condition. Removing their data left A relatively unchanged by full versus divided attention (.27 and.26). ' lnstmctions arc important for satisfying assumptions underlying the estimation procedure' In contrast to results found by using direct-rctrieval instnrctions, generaterccognize instnritions produced a paradoxical dissociation' Sigrrlficant differences-in base rate between inclusion and ex-clusion tests provide direct evidence of the violation of assumptions. Such differences were found when generate-induces correlation between them. A mathematical analysis showed that the correlation produced by the estimation procedure can be either positive or negative, depending on the underlying parameters for the automatic and recollective memory plocesses (Jacoby & Shrout, 1997) . Curran and Hintzman (1995) computed estimates of R and A for base-rate items (new) as well as for old items. Estimates of R for old items (R.rJ and A for new items (A**) come from different trials so correlations between them are not based on the same empirical facts and cannot be a rcsult of the estimation procedurc. This makes it useful to comparc corrclations between Roro and A for old items (AouJ with those between Ro6 and A* to examine the contribution to corrclation that might come from the cstimation procedurc.
Conelation at thc level of participants. Curran and Hintzman (1995) intcrprercd their finding of an invene corrclation between R and A at the level of participants as providing evidencc that participants relicd on a generaterccognize sfategy. We computed estinatcs of &ra and Aa6 by aggregating across items and conditions of attention for each participant. The correlation between Ra6 and Aa6 at the level of participants Cfable 3) was significant in the directretrieval condition but was not significant in the generat+ rccognize condition. This result demonstratcs that use of a generatFrecognize strategy does not always produce an inverse corrclation between R and A at thc level of participants. Also, it cannot be argued that the significant correlation betwecn R4a and Aa6 in the direct-rctricval condition proves that participants in thatcondition relicd on a generatts rccognize sfrtegy. The signifcant correlation may have come from othcr sources such as the estimation procedure itself. In line with that possibility, the corclation betwecn Rop and A*. was not significant in the direct-retrieval condition.
Correlation at thc level of items. Findings of significant corrclations at the level of ircms were interpreted by Curran and Hinr?man (1995) as direct evidence of violation of the independence assumption underlying the processdissociation procedurc. To compute those corrclations (fable 4), we aggregated across participants and conditions of attention. Corrclations obtained by Curran and Hinrzman (1995) in their Experiment 5 are prcsented for purposes of comparison. The corrclation bgrween Ro6 and Aa6 was significant in both the dircct-retrieval and the generatHecognize conditions. Curran and Hintzman (1995) found that the correlation between R6u and A** was as high as that between Ra6 and 4o16, which they (tlintzman & Curran, 197) took as strong evidence that item differences, rather than the estimation procedurc, were responsible for both correlations. As shown in Table 4 , we also found the corrclation of R"6 and A** to be as high as that between Ra6 and Aa6 but only in the generate-recoguze condition. In the direct-rctrieval condition, the correlation between Raa and A**, computed on those same items, was near zero. For the direct-retrieval condition, one cannot dismiss the possibility that the corrclation between Raa and .Ao16 wls produced by the estimation procedure.
One concern is that correlations at the item level might unduly reflect the contribution of items that gave rise to -.65r* -.18 -.35* Note. R : thc estimatc of thc probability tlnt participants could complete a stcm with an old word bccausc they recollcctcd the studied word; A = the cstimatc of thc probability that participants could complerc a stem with an old word becausc thc old word carnc automatically to mind. *p < .05. **p <.01.
perfect performancc on either thc inclusion test or thc exclusion test Indee4 eliminating items that produccd cither a probability of 1.0 for inclusion or a probability of 0 for exclusion reduced the corrclation between Ra6 and Aa6 for the direct-retrieval condition but not for thc generatF rccognize condition.
Comparison of item-based and paniciputt-based estimotes. Curran alld fllntzmsn (1995) used thc positivc corrclation between R andA at the ircm level to infer that the unobservable correlation responsible for the bias prcduced by aggrcgating across items for cach participant was also positive. Because of the unobscrvable positivc correlation,A was said tobe utderestimated by an amount that incrcased with increases in R, producing a paradoxical dissociation. Their arguments can also be applied to predict results for item-based estimates. There, corrclation at the item level cannot be a source of bias because estimates were obtained for each item. Rather, the potential sounoe of aggregation bias is produced by aggregating across participants to gain estimates of R and A for each item. One can usc thc obscrvcd corrclation at the participant level to infer the unobservable correlation rcsponsible for bias produccd by aggregating across participants, just as did Curran and Hintzman to infer the correlation at the unobservable participant-itcm level. However, the correlation at the participant level is negative, which means that the same should be tme for the unobservable corrclation at the item-participant level, and that A should be overestimated by an amount that incrcases with incrcases in R.
For the direct-retrieval condition, the inverse correlation between R and A at the level of participants (-.43) was of similar magnitude, but opposite in direction, to the conelation at the level of items (.38). Consequently, one might expect paradoxical dissociations of similar magnitude but opposite forms for item-based and participant-based estimates. However, the panern of results for the direct-retieval .55** .70r* 120 (83) % (46) 120 (58) 120 (63) e6 (20) 120 (s8) Notc. Numbcrs in parenthcscs are the correlations, with corrcsponding numbcr of obscrvations, calculatcd aftcr rcmoving any itcm that had an A estimatc that was undefincd l, or 0. R : the cstirnatc of thc probability that participants could complcrc a stcm with rn old word becausc thcy recollectcd thc surdicd word; A : thc cstimate of thc probability ttnt participants could complctc a stcm with an old word bccausc tbc word camc autornaticallv to mhd. n = numbcr of obscrvations. *p < 05. **p ( .01.
condition was the same whether estimates werc computed for cach participant or for cach item. When items that produccd pcrfect scores on inclusion or cxclusion tests werc climinatc4 estimates comput€d for each item showed that dividing attention reduced R (22 vs. . I I ) but left A rclatively invariant (.50 vs. .49). Base ratc for those items was .40. Similarly, when computed for cach participant (none of whom had perfect scones on inclusion or cxclusion tcsts) cstimatcs of R were reduced by dividing attention (.29 vs. .14), but estimatcs of A were relatively unchanged (.54 vs. .55). Base rate for those participants was .44. The comparison of rcsults computcd from participant mcans with those computcd from item means is a variant of the strarcgy of using a guasi-F ratio to avoid the "languageas-fixed effect fallacy" (Cladq 1973) . How is it possible to find significant corr€lations at the participant level and at the ircm level and not have bias rcsult from aggrcgating across eithcr of the two levels to find estimates? The correlation that is important for aggrcgation bias is not at the participant levcl or at the item level but, rather, at the itemlarticipant level or participant-item level, dependent on how es"mates arc computed. The corrclations rcsponsible for aggrcgation bias cannot bc directly obscrved, nor can thcy be inferred ftom thc corrclations observed at the participant or item level (Jacoby & Shrout, 1997) .
Although it is possible for aggrcgation bias to dramatically distort estimates (Hintzman & Curran, 1997) , it seems unlikely that aggregation bias played a role in producing rcsults observed for the direct-retrieval condition. To argue otherwise, one has to claim that the paradoxical dissociation that should have been, but was not, observed when estimates were obtained for each participant was offset by a tme effect of dividing attention on A that was opposite to that which offset the paradoxical dissociation that should have been, but was noL observed when estimates wer€ obtained for each itcm. Aparadoxical dissociation was obtained in the generaterecognize condition. However, that paradoxical dissociation was produccd by violating assumptions underlying the estimation proccdure ratherthan by aggrcgation bias.
Instructions arc an important boundary condition for mecting assumptions underlying the processdissociation procedurc. Rcsults of E:<pcriment I showed that directrctrieval instnrctions produced effects that rcplicated those rcportcd by Jacoby ct al. (1993) . However, participants' reliancc on a generato{€cognize strategy violates assump tions of the cstimation proccdure (Curran & Hintzman, 1995; Jacoby ct 81., 1993) . The differencc in base rates for inclusion and exclusion tests indexed participants' reliance on a gencratc<ecognize strategy$ase rate was significantly lower for the exclusion test only when generaterccognizc instnrctions werc used. Corrclations, in contrast, were not useful for testing whethcr assumptions of the cstination procedurc werc met. Observed corrclations in the direct-rctrieval condition might have come from sounces other than violation of the independence assumption, including the estimation procedure itself.
Experiment 2
Reliance on subjective reports provides an altemative to the processdssociation procedure as a means of separating the contributions of rccollection and automatic influences of memory. Following Tilving (1985), Gardiner and his colleagues (e.g., Gardiner, 1988; Gardiner & Java, l9l; Gardiner & Parkin, 1990 ) have used a rcmember-know proccdurc to investigate the phenomenology that accompanies memory performance. Participants are instmcted to respond "r€member" only if they can remember the dQtails surrounding the study pr€sentation of a test item and to respond "know" if they feel certain that a test item was earlier studied but are unable to recall the details of its study presentation.
In Experiment 2, we combined the remember-know procedure with the independence assumption from the processd.issociation procedure to examine effects of study time in rccall cued with word stems. Just as wils done with instructions for an inclusion tesl participants were told to use slems as a cue for recall of an earlier-studied word or, if they could.not do so, to complete stems with the fint word that came to mind. However, participants were also rcquired to report on the subjective experience that accompanied their production of a completion word. Immediately after producing a completion wor4 participants wer€ to classify the completion word as one that tbey "remember" as earlier sftdie4 one that they "know" was eadier studied, or as "new," not earlier studied.
For our independence/remember&ow (IRK) procedure, the probability of "rcmembcring" scrved as a measurc of recollection (e.g., Jacobn Yonelinas, g Jennings, 1997; Lindsay & Kcllcy, 1996; Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1996) . Participants should classify an old word as "know" or "new" only if thc word came automatically to mind but was not recollectcd as earlier studicd: A(1 -R). That combination is the same as for mistakenly producing an old word on an exclusion tesL Conscquently, the independence assumP tion can bc uscd to estimate A as
In Experimcnt l, instnrcting participants to usc a generatF recognize straEgy produced a paradoxical dissociation. Reliance on that stratcgy resulted in participants excluding words that came to mind automatically and werc then rccognizcd as wcll as words that wcrc recollectcd. Rccognition without recollcction describes words judgcd as "know" in the IRK pnoccdurc. When using a gcneratHecoguzs strategy for an exclusion tcst, only old words that would be judged as "new" should bc mistakenly uscd as a completion. To mimic cffccts of a generato<ecognizn smtegy, words that participans "know" were carlicr studied can be grouped with old words judgcd as "remembcr" rather than with those judged as "new" when cstimating A: P(New)/ I -lP(Remember) + P(Ituow)]. Estimating A in this way was expectcd to produce a paradoxical dissociation that was the same as that found in the generatHccognize condition in Experiment 1.
The IRK procedurc is a rcfinement of a procedure that Curran and Hintzman (1995) uscd to produce a paradoxical dissociation by manipulating study time. For their rccollect and exclude procedud, participants tried to give rwo rcsponscs !o each stem. The probability of recollection was measured as the probability of an old word being written in a column labeled rcmemben In contrast, the probability of rvriting an old word in a column labeled new was said to be equivalent to the probability of mistakenly using an old word as a completion for an exclusion test and, consequently, was divided by [ -P(Remember)] to estimate A. This division is motivated by the assumption that R and A independently contriburc to performance. Curran and Hintzman later rcjected their new procedurc because it too showed violation of the independence assumption by revealing a paradoxical dissociation produced by the manipulation of study time.
A weakness of the recollect and exclude procedure is that participants are not allowed to distinguish between words that they "remember" and words that they only "know" were studied earlier. Consequently, it seems likely that participants would, at least sometimes, write words that they only "know" are old in the "remember" column. Their doing so would result in an overestimate of rccollection along with a paradoxical dissociation just as would the generate-recogrrize version ofour IRK procedure or use ofa generate-recognize strategy in combination with the inclusion--exclusion procedure. Results from the generaterecognize version of the IRK procedure were compared with results from Curran and Hinzman's (1995) recollect and exclude procedure to show that both the paradoxical dissociation and corrclations between R andA were the same for thc two procedurcs. The probability of false recollection, measured by thc probability of rcsponding "r€member" to new words, was examined to assess whether false recollection was likely to have played a role in producing base-rate differences observed with the inclusion-cxclusion procedure.
Method
Participants. TWenty-four students participated in thc cxpcrimcnt in rcturn for crcdit in an introductory psychology coursc at McMastcr Univenity. One additional participant was tcstc4 but his data werc discarded bccausc he did not classify any rccallcd words as "knoq" suggesting that he failed to undcrstand instructions.
Materials and design To accommodatc thc change from thc inclusion+xclusion pnocedurc in Experiment I to thc remcmbcrknow proccdurc in this cxpcrimcnt, wc modified the matcrials and dcsign sligbtly. Thc only changas in thc marcrials wcrc in tbc sizc of scts uscd to consEuct lists, which changed from 40 itcms pcr sct o 32 itcms per sct, and in the overall basc rate of thc itcms when ncw, which changcd from .44 to .35. Rather than manipulating ancntion during study, prcs€ntation duration (l s vs. l0 s) for study was manipulatcd, ari was done in Curran and Hintzmrn's (1995) cxpcriments. TWo study lists of 42 ircms cach (32 critical itcms and l0 buffcr ircms) werp prescnted, with items in onc list prescntcd for l0 s cach and itcms in the othcr list prcscntcd for I s cach. Tbc order of prcscntation of the study lists was balanccd across paticipants rc that half of thc participants had thc long sodyduration list first and the other half had it sccond. There was only onc lcst list that compriscd 96 items; 32 stems rcprcscntcd cach of thc tbrec typcs of word (lGs study, l-s study, and ncw).
Prccedure. For both study lists, participants saw a list of words on thc ssreen prcscnrcd one word at a timc. Participants wcrc instructcd to read thc words aloud and to try to remcmbcr thcm for a latcr mcmory tcsr Aftcr the first list, participants were simply rcminded prior to the prcscntation of the second list to read the words and to try to remembcr them for the following mcmory test" lnstructions for thc test appear in Appcndix B. Participants wcrc told to use the stem as a cue to help them rccall a word that was prcsented in either of the study lisa and to use the rccalled word to complete the stem. If they could not recall a suitable study word, they werc to complete the stem with the first S-letter word that came to mind that fit the stem. Participants were told that no ProPer names or plurals werc allowed as completions. Once a stcm was completed, we prcsscd a key to clear the screen, and then the participant judged the completion word as "rcmember," "know," or "new." A "remembcr" rcsponse was to be givcn if the panicipants could consciously remember details of the prior encounter with the word in the study list. For example, they may remember some specific detail about its prior presentation, such as t2 JACOBY an image, or some Personal significance they may have thought of at the time of study, or they may rcmember how the word looked on the screen. "Know" meant participants knew for a fact that the word was prcsented in study but could not remember any specific details about its prior presentation. "New" meant the word had not bcen prcsented earlier in either of the shrdy lists. Once we had entered each participant's decision, the next trial was presented after a 0.5-s delay. If the word stem was not completed within the alloted time, a beep sounded, and we initiated the next trial.
Results and Discussion
Prcportion of stems completed with old words. Performance on the stem-completion task was higher for old words than for new words, F(1,23): 379.10, MSE :0.002, and words presented at the l0-s study duration were significantly more likely to be given as a completion than were words prcscnted at the 1-s study duration, F(L, 23) = 13.55, MSE :0.007. The probabilities of "rcmemb€ and "new" rcsponses, as a function of study duration, arc shown in Table 5 . Those probabilities werc used to simulate perfonnance on inclusion and exclusion tests (Iable l). Inclusion performance was estimated as the probability of producing an old word as a completion. To mimic direct rctrieval, "know" rcsponses were added to "new" rcsPonses to rcpresent exclusion performance, whercas to mimic generate-r€cognize, only "new" responses rcprcsented exclusion perforrnance. For direct retrieval, base rates were estimated as .38 for the inclusion test and .36 for the cxclusion test. In contrast, for generate-*ecognzn perforrnance, new words that participants mistakenly classified as "rmember" or "know" would be excluded, producing a base-rate difference between inclusion and exclusion tests (.38 vs. .27) .
Use of the remember-know procedure allowed us to cxamine false recollection of new words. Results showed that the probability of mistakenly saying "remember" after producing a completion word that was actually new was very low (.02). Probably by coincidence, that Probability was the same as the differcnce in base rates for inclusion and exclusion tests found for direct-rctrieval conditions in Experiment 1. The slightly lower base rate for the exclusion test in that experiment might reflect false recollection. However, if it does, the probability of false rccollection was not sufficient to produce a significant differcnce in base rates' [n Curran and Hintzman's (1995) Experiment 3, which used the recollect and exclude procedure, they found the probability of "false recall" for new items to be .12-a probability neady identical to the sum of false remembering and false Table 5 Mean Probabilities of Completion With Study Word and "Remember" "Know," and "New" Responses for Experhnent 2
Condition
Remembcr Know Iong (10 s) Short (l s) New knowing in ow experiment (. I I ). Such a high probability of false recall makes it almost certain that participants in Curran and Hintzman's experiment misclassified as "remembered" words that would be called "know" if they had the option. Further, these results suggest that base-rate differences between inclusion and exclusion tests in the generaterecognize condition of Experiment I were largely produced by false "knowing" rather than by false recollection.
Estimates of R and A. Results using the direct-retrieval equations Clable 2), grouping "know" responses with "new" rcsponses to compute estimates' showed that rcducing study time from a 10-s to a l-s duration decreased R, F(L,23) : 49.84, MSE = 0.010, but leftA almost perfectly invariant, F < 1. This rcsult did not qeflect insensitivity of our mqnurc. The power to detect ai etrect on A as that observed when A was calculated in a way meant to mimic use of a generate-{ecogln?E strategy was >.995 (Cohen's d: 1.35\ . This result suPports our prediction that A would not differ for the lGs and l-s duration conditions. Estimates of A for old items werc significantly above baseline, F(1,23) : 33.17, MSE : 0.009, showing a large effect of study on automatic influences of memory.
A paradoxical dissociation was found when "know" rcsponses werc grouped with "remember" rather than with "new" rcsponses, the generate-recogIrrTa version of equations. Reducing study time from 10 s to I s decreased recollection, F(L,23\ : 44.15, MSE :0.012, but had the opposite cffect of increasing A, F(1, 23) : 29.0t' MSE = 0.009. For words studied at the l0-s duration, A was significantly below baseline, F(1,23\ = 42.93, MSE = 0.b09, which is a certain sign that the assumptions underlying the estimation procedurc were violated.
The pattern of results for the generate-rccoguze version of the IRK procedurc was the same as found in Curran and Hintzman's (1995) Experiment 3, which used the recollect and cxclude procedurc (Table 2) . That similarity suggests that thcir paradoxical dissociation resulted because words that would have becn called "know," if participants had the option of doing so, werc sometimes misclassified as "rcmember." The differcnce in rcsults is as much because of differcnces in "inclusion" performance as differences in "exclusion" performance (Table l) and can be explained as being a result of rccollection being higher in our experiment. The differcnce in rccollection seems particularly pronounced for words in the l0-s study condition. For those items, inclusion performance is substantially higher' and cxclusion performance is more accurate for the IRK procedure than for the rccollect and exclude procedure. For their Experiment 3, Curran and Hintzman tested participants in groups of I to 10. Our procedure, in contrast, tested participants individually and requircd them to pronounce study words aloud. These differences in procedure are likely to explain the higher recollection in our experimenL
Conelations. The pattern of correlations was the same as observed in Experiment l, but correlations were somewhat larger in magnitude. Although the number of participants in Experiment 2 was only half that of Experiment l, the number of observations on which estimates were based was the same because a single test was used, rather than . inclusion and exclusion tests. The correlation berween Ro16 and 4o6 at the participant level (Iable 3) was significant in direct-retrieval estimates, and the correlation at the item level (Iable 4) was significant in both direct-retrieval and generate-recognize estimates. The correlation between Ro16 and Ao* at the item level was significant only in generaterecognize estimates. The pattern of correlations found with generatFrecognize estimates is strikingly similar to that found by Curran and Hintzman (1995) in their Experiments 3 and 5 Clable 4).
As in Experiment 1, direct-rctrieval estimates revealed correlations at the participant and item levels that were approximately equal in magnitude but op,posite in direction. If those observed corrclations rcflect the unobservable corrclations rcsponsible for aggregation bias, item-based estimates and participant-based estimates of R and A should show opposite paradoxical dissociations. However, the pattern of results for item-bascd estimates was the same as for participant-based estimates. Item-based estimates showed that increasing study duration incrcased R (.15 vs' .32) but left A unchanged (.5a vs. .54). Base rate for item-based estimates was .39.
For direct-rctrieval estimates, it seems unlikely that aggregation bias played a role in the rcsults. As stated before, to argue otherwise, one has to claim that the paradoxical dissociation that should have been, but was not' observeO when estimates were obtained for each participant was offset by a true effect on A of increasing study time that was opposite to that which offset the paradoxical dissociation that should have been, but was not" observed when estimates werc obtained for each item.
Results ftom other experiments using thc IRK procedure with cued recall. Jacoby and Hay (in prcss) used the IRK procedurc to examine the effect of full versus divided inention during study. The materials and procedure were the same ns in Experiment l, except that Jacoby and Hay used the remember-know test procedure of Expcriment 2. The direct-retrieval version of the IRK procedure' using participant-based means, showed that divided attention during itudy as comparcd with full attention reduced R (.25 and .09) but leftA unchanged (.61 and .61). Base rate was .46, and the probabilities of false recollection and false knowing were .OZ anA .11. The pagprn of rcsults was the same when item-based -"*, *"ft used-full vemus divided attention left A relatively unchanged (.58 and .56). In contrast" mimicking a generate--recogruze strategy by treating the sum of "rimember" and "know" rcsponses as a measure of recollection revealed a paradolical dissociation. The pattern of correlations was the same as reported here (see Tables 3  and 4) . Again, a significant correlation between Ro14 aod Ao* at the item level was found only with the generate-rccognize version of the IRK procedure. Significant correlations that were observed cannot be used to test the independence assumption underlying the estimation procedure because of possibie contributions to those correlations from other io.rc"s, including the estimation procedure iself.
The IRK procedure produced results that are the same as those found with the inclusion-+xclusion procedure. Jacoby' Yonelinas, & Jennings (1997) also showed that values of estimates were extraordinarily close across the two procedures in a series of experiments done to examine crossmodality transfer in rccall cued with word fragments' For "remember" responses to serve as a valid measure of recollection, participants must be aware of recollecting old words that come to mind as a completion for a stem. Such awareness is also required to use recollection as a means to avoid mistakenly producing old words on an exclusion test. The inclusion-exclusion procedure differs from the IRK procedure by requiring that participants use awareness as a basis for conscious control of rcsponding, rather than only rcport on awarcness. When adequate time is given for responding, the two procedures are likely to pnrduce the same pattern of results. However, because the inclusionexclusion procedurc measur€s R as that which affords contnol over rcsponses, and the IRK procedurc measurcs phenomenological experienoe, we cxpect that the two necd not always coincide.
Comparisons with results ftom other experiments using subjective report procedures. M:inryH (1993) used a cuedrecall procedure and found that age-rclated differences in memory influenced "rcmember" rcsponses but left "know" responses unchanged. Thc same Pattern of rcsults was produced by manipulating study time. Our rcsults agree with those of MiinryH. If one looks only at "rcmember" and "know" responses, as he did, decrcasing study time reduced the probability of a "remember" response but did not change the probability of a "know" response (Iable 5). However, Miintyll did not cncourage participants in his experimcnts to guess, whereas we requircd participants to always produce a completion, guessing if necessary. By our view, knowing is on a continuum that includes items that participants call "new." Old items that are produced as a r€sponse and called "know" or "new" are combined to estimate automatic influences. Rather than try to eliminate guessing, we rcquired guessing and separated automatic influences of memory from recollection (Jacoby, Yonelinas, & Jennings, 197) . Doing so shows that increasing study time incrcases recollection but leaves automatic influences of memory unchanged in recall cued with word stems.
Toth, Reingold, and Jacoby (194) used the inclusionexclusion procedurc and found that manipulating level of processing influenced R but left A rclatively unchanged. Experiments with stem-completion performance as an indirect test of memory have found small, if any, effect of manipulating level of processing (for a review, see Challis & Brodbeck, 192) . In conmst, Richardson-Klavehn and Gardiner (1996; Richardson-Klavehn, Gardiner, & Iavq 1996) used a procedure that was very similar to Curran and Hintzman's (1D5) recollect and exclude procedure and found a paradoxical dissociation produced by level of processing. Deep processing, as compared with shallow processing, was found to increase R but to decrease A. Interpretation of their rcsults is made difficult by floor effects. Particularly after deep processing, many participans had zero scores for exclusion performance. Jacoby, Begg' & Toth (199?) described how such floor effects could produce a "paradoxical" dissociation. The interpretation ofresults is further complicated by the possibility that participants classified as "remember" completions that were produced because of automatic influences of memory but werc then recognized as old. The problem is the same as described for Curran and Hintzman's recollect and exclude procedurc and also applies to experiments done by De Houwer (in prcss) that used subjective reports to measure recollection. Richardson-Klavehn and Gardiner interpreted their rcsults as rcflecting "involuntary conscious memory," which refen to cases in which an old word involuntarily comes to mind as I completion followed by awarcness that the word is old. Rcingold and Toth (1996) discussed the rclation between involuntary conscious memory and recognition memory in a generatHecognize strategy. The two notions secm very similar with the major difference being that the recognition in a generate-rccogtrzo smtegy is not involuntary. We rcturn to this topic in the General Discussion.
Experiment 3
Experiment 3 was similar to Expcriment 1 but examined cffects of snrdy time rather than effects of full venus divided attention. Curran and Hintzman (1995) rcported three cxperiments that used our inclusion-exclusion procedure to investigate the effects of presenting words for 1 s versus l0 s for study. In ttreir first experimenl base rate was .12, and estimates computed by using results ttrat included participants who performed perfectly on the cxclusion te,st (0 scorcs) revealed a paradoxical dissociation by showing that A decrcased with incrcased study time (.16 vs. .12). When zercs werc removed, A was nearly identical for the two conditions (.18 vs. .17), and the difference was no longer significant. In their Experiment 4, they used stems having a higher base rate (.31) so as to reduce the likelihood of zeros for the exclusion test. Results from that experiment showed that A was near identical for the longduration and shortduration conditions (.35 vs. .36). When zcros werc rcmovc4 the small difference benveen conditions was revcrscd (.40 vs. .39). (SeeJacoby, Begg, &Toth, 1997, andther€sponse by Curran & Hintzmann, 1997 , for a discussion of whether the invariance in A was produced by participants'misunderstanding of exclusion instnrctions.) In their Experiment 5, Curran and Hintzman (1995) used a practice session that was meant to ensure that participants properly understood exclusion instnrctions and found a paradoxical dissociation even when zeros in exclusion were rcmoved. For that experiment, base rate for the exclusion test was significantly below that on the inclusion test. This difference in base rate was ignorcd when computing estimates. Curran and Hintzman (1995) justified ignoring the significant difference in base rates by saying they were unable to ascertain any reason why an influence on estimates of A would result from doing so (p. 542). Furttrer, they argued that the lower base rate for the exclusion test may have been produced by participants falsely recollecting some new items as old. and if so, the difference in base rates could be safely ignored. However, the low probability of false recollection observed in Experiment 2, reported herc, makes it unlikely that false recollection was responsible for the significant base-rate difference observed in Cunan and Hintzman's experiment. Experiment 3 was done to show that significant differences in base rate between inclusion and exclusion tests, comparable to those found by Curan and Hintzman, are important for finding a paradoxical dissociation. For a generate-recognize condition, we expected to find such differences in base rate along with a paradoxical dissociation just as was found in our Experiments I and 2. For a direct-rctrieval condition, manipulating study time was expected to influence R but to leave A rclatively invariant.
In Experimcnt 3, we used a base rate that was even higher than thatuscdlin Cunan and Hintzman's (1995) Experiments 4 and 5. Wc expccted the higher bfse rate to allow zero scorcs to be avoided in the direct-rctrieval condition, although some zero scorcs might rcmain in the generaterccognizc condition. Another difference between our experiment and Curran and Hintzman's experiments was that we rcquircdourparticipants to pronounc€ study words aloud, as we have usually done, to ensune that they asended to each of the study words. As did Curran and Hintzman, we intermixcd inclusion and exclusion tests for both the dircctretricval and generatHecogruze conditions. Buchner, Erdfelder, & Vatenodt-Pltinnecke (1995) proposcd a multinomial model that allows base-rate difrercnces to be taken into account when using thc processdissociation procedurc. Thcir model trcats guessing as independent of automatic influcnces of memory and uses pcrformancc on new itcms to estimarc the probability of corect responding on the basis of guessing. Yonelinas and Jacoby (1996) compared rcsults produced by different models of response bias used to deal with base rates. If base rates do not differ across conditions and one's only intercst is dissociations, then a choice among models of response bias is not ncccssary. Using a multinomial model @uchner et al., 1995) to separate base rate from automatic influences of memory docs not change the pattern of results but does produce an estimate of automatic influences of memory that differs in magnitude from ttrat gained by subtracting base rate from A. Howevcr, il base rate is lower for thc exclusion test than for the inclusion test because of criterion differences, R will be inflatcd by an amount that rcflects the differcnce in base rate between the two types of test, and A will be invalid because of the reliance of its estimation on R. To be successful, a modcl of rcsponsc bias must "conect" for base-rate differcnces between inclusion-+xclusion tests by producing resuls that are the same as observed when base rates do not differ across types of test.
For experiments reported herc, we compared results gained by using our original estimation procedure with rcsults gained by using the multinomial approach proposed by Buchner et al. (1995) . Reliance on a generate-{ecognize strategy as opposed to a direct-retrieval strategy changes the nature of task performance in a way that invalidates our estimation procedure as well as creating base-rate differences. Consequently, we did not expect the paradoxical dissociation in the generate-recognize condition to be eliminated when the multinomial approach was used to correct for base-rate differences. As we show, the utility of a multinomial approach is as reliant on assumptions as is the original estimation procedure, and is use to correct for base-rate differences is not legitimate if assumptions underlying the process-dissociation procedure are violated.
Method
Participants. Forty-cight students participatcd in the experimcnt in rcnlm for crcdit in an inductory psychology coursc at McMastcr Univcrsity. Half of the participants wer€ randomly assigned to thc direct-rctricval tcst condition, and thc otber participans wcre assigncd to thc gencratHEcognizc rcst condition. Ninc additional participants wcre tcstc4 but thcir data wcre discardcd for purposcs of analyscs. TWo of thcsc participants wcrc in the dircct-retricval condition. One of tbosc participants had pcrfcct performancc (1.0) in thc inclusion-long study condition, and thc other participant had pcrfcct perfonnancc (zcro) in thc cxclusion-long study condition. Thc remaining 7 participants' whosc data werc discarded, werc in thc gcncrat+lecognizc condition. Thrcc of tbosc participants had a zcro in tbc cxclusion-long study condition, I participant had a 1.0 in thc inclusion-long study condition, and thc p6eining 3 participants failcd to undcrstand or to follow instructions. Participants in both conditions wcrc askcd at thc cnd of thc cxpcrimcnt whether thcy bad givcn old words when cucd with thc FomPt newT \\ren participants in thc generatorecognize condition answered that question in a way that was intcrprctcd as thcir failing to follow instructions. TWo participants reportcd that they complctcd thc stcrns witb thc first word that camc to mind rcgardlcss of whethcr the prompt was oA or ncw. Thc otbcr participant reportcd rcsponding with old words whcn hc or shc could not think of an altcrnativc completion.
Matcrials and pmcedurc. Matcrials werc largely thc same as thosc uscd in Expcriment l. Experimcnt 3 was actually donc bcfore Experimcnt l, and matcrials wcrc rebalanccd Orokcn into different subsets) for Expcriment I becausc thc basc ratcs for somc of thc complction words for the stems whcn ncw wcrc sligh0y diffcrcnt for thc Texas participants, as comparcd with thc Ontario participants (e.g., strrl,-i "smash": Texas .28, Ontario .04; "small": lcxas .07. Ontario .41). The constnrction of lists and proccdurc was thc same as for thc direct-rctricval condition in Expcriment I' exccpt for thc manipulation in the study phasc. Rather than manipulating attention during study, prcscntation duration (10 s vs. I s) for study was manipulatcd as was donc in Curru and Hintzman's ( I 995) cxPerimcns.
Tlvo study lists of 50 words cach (40 critical itcms and l0 bufrer itcms) wcre prescnted withitems in onc list Prescnted for l0 s each and items in thc other list for I s cach. Thc rcst list consistcd of 120 thrcelencr word stems with '!0 stems rePrcsenting each of thc types of word flong study, short str,rdn and new)' For cach word typ", tt"f of the stems werc prcscnted in thc inclusion-test conAition, and half werc prcsented in the cxclusion-test condition' The inclusion-and exclusion-test items were intcrmixed and cucd by the prompts old and new as in the direct-rctrieval tcst conditions in Experiment l.
Instructions for the study phases werc the same as for Experiment 2. and instructions for the direct-retrieval test condition were similar to thosc in Experiment l. Instnrctions for thc generaorecognize t€st condition werc also similar to thosc in Experiment I but were modified to accommodate the inrcrmixing of inclusion and exclusion lests. In the generate--recognize test condition, participants were told that if a stem aPpeared with the cue word oA' it was all right to complete the stem with a previously studied word, but it was not necessary to do so. They were instn'rcted to complete those stems as quickly as possible with the fint word that came to mind, In contrast, il the cue word was new, participants werc told not to use an old word but rather to complete the stem with a new word. They were instructed to check their memory to be sure that a completion that came to mind was not one that had becn carlier studied. If the completion word sccmed at all familiar, they werc not to use it but, instead, werc to try to think of a differcnt completion. If they were unable to think of a different completion, they werc to leavc the stem incomplete and let the l5-s completion deadlinc clapse.
Results and Discussion
Prcportion of stems completed with old words. Performance on the inclusion test Gable 1) was higher for thc lGs than for the l-s study condition, F(1, 46) : 8.39, MSE : 0.014. Although the interaction of instnrction and study duration was not significanl the advantage of longer study was numerically larger in the direct-retrieval test condition than in the generate+ecognizc test condition' For the exclusion tes! participants were less likely to mistakenly use an old word as a completion in the generate.-recognize tast condition, as compared with direct rctrieval, F(1,46) = 15.29, MSE: 0.026. Exclusion performance was also morc accurate for the lGs study condition than for the l-s, F(1, 46) : 35.96, MSE = 0.010. In the direct-retrieval condition, the differcnce in baseline completion rates for the inclusion and cxclusion tests did not ipproach siSnifigance, F < l. However, in the generat+recognize condition, basc rate was much lower for the exclusion tcst than for the inclusion test' F(1,23) : 8.93, MSE: 0.012. The overall pattern of results shows thc cxpccted differcnces between direct-rerieval and generatFr€cognizc strategies.
Estimates of R and A. Thc probability of recollection Clable 2) was highcr in the generate<ecogruze test condition than in dirEct rctrieval, F(1,46) : 4.36, MSE = 0.O57. For both test conditions, recollection was higher for the lGs study condition than for the l-s, F(1, 46) : A.Ul, MSE : 0.u27.
Thc analysis of A revealcd a significant int€raction bctween study duration and rcst conditions, F(I, 46\ : 5.23, MSE : 0.018. Thc rcsults of the direct-rctrieval condition showed a process dissociation that is of the same form as found in Experiments 1 and 2. Shorrcning the snrdy duration from l0 s to I s decreased R, F(1,235 = 23.r, MSE = 0.024, but left A almost perfectly invariant, F < 1. This rcsult did not rcflect insensitivity of our measurc because the power to detect an effect on A as large as the effect on A observed in the generate-reco$uze condition was .90 (Cohen's d = 0.88). Estimates of A for old items were significantly above base rate, F(1,23) : 53.28, MSE : 0.007' showing a large effect of study on automatic influences of memory.
A paradoxical dissociation was found in the generaterccognize condition. Reducing study time from l0 s to I s decreased R, F(1, 23) : 12.tt, MSE = 0.031, but had the opposite effect of incrcasing A, F(1, 23'S = 6'9O, MSE = 0.021. For words studied at the l-s duration, A was significantly above baseline, F(1,23) = 8.26,MSE = 0.009, but for the lGs duration, A did not differ from baseline, F ( 1. Participants' rcliance on a generate-recognize strategy produced a paradoxical dissociation by violating both theindependencl assumption and the assumption of equality of R for inclusion and exclusion tests.
Multinomial model analyses. For each instnrctional condition, we gained parameter estimates by using a direcrretrieval multinomial model adapted from Buchner et al', (1995, see Appendix C) . This model includes consciously conrolled and automatic processes' as well as a third prooess, guessing, all of which are independent. Thus, we used six parameters, Rrog, Rr*,, Aug, A.u.,, Gi*, and G""" to fit @uincy data from-the six cells of cach instnrctional condition (inclusion short' inclusion long, inclusion ne% exclusion shor! exclusion long, and exclusion new)' Therc were a total of 2,880 observations (z participans x 120 obscrvationJparticipant) in each instnrctional condition' Separate fits werc obtained for the direct-retrieval and gcneratHoc oguze instructional conditions.
The G-pow-r program made available by Erdfelder, Faul, and Buchner (1996) was used !o conduct a post hoc powe-r anatysis to oUttio values of B and the critical value of X2' this analysis rcquired input of four parameters, w (the "cffect siie" for ini-square tests; Cohen' 1977') , N, cr, and the degrees of fr,eedom. We uscd w : 0.10, N = 2,880, a = 0.005,-and one degree of freedom. The-power analysis yielded F : 0.0052 (power = .9948) ano f"(t)
: 7'88' ' To test the indepcndence assumption, wc tested the frt of a restricted version of the model where Apo, = A5o,, (sce Riefer & Barchelder' 1988 , for a discussion of placing restrictions on parameters to reflect assumptions in a multinomial modeD. The fits of the model to the data werc assessed with the maximum-likelihood statistic, G, computed by using the multinomial binary tree (MBT) progam tHo, tggS) and comparca against a chi-square distribution with one degrce of freedom. If the independence assumption of the multinomial model is valid and study duration does not influence A, then the restricted version of the model should fit the data from the direct-rctrieval condition' In contrast, we cxpcctcd that the model would not fit the data from the generate'{€cognize condition because the instnrctions given to participants in that condition induccd Prccess depei<lence, ana thercfore Ah.s should n91 eual A.r'o.,'-A dependence venion of the model would not have the ,.,ni"tion that A*, = A'm" an4 of course' would fit the data" because without that restriction therc are 8s many pammeters as cells so that therc are no degrees of freedom left for a test.
The fit of the restricted model to data from the dir€ct-retrieval condition was extremely good, @:1t1 = 0'52' As with the ANOVA canied out on these data in the prcvious section, we failed to reject the hypothesis that 14.6r : 4*sn' In contrast, for the generate-recognrza data' the fit of the model was poor, 62(l) = 9'16, p < '005'The poor fit of the rcstricted -od"t to the generate<ecognize data necessitates rcjection of the hypothesis ttrat 4*s 1A,5o,. ' Again, the rciults of the multinomial analysis for the generatF rccognize data paralel those of the ANOVA, where estimatJs of A6, were found to be significantly lower than estimates of A161.
Multinomial analyses were also done by using the data from Experiment 1. Using the same direct-retrievd model (substitu-ting the paramet-N Rn u' Ro", Arut, A6-Gio, and b",.;, ,"" nioe aata from the six cells of each instnrctional "onaition in Experiment I (inclusion{ivided, inclusionfull, inclusion-n-ew, exclusion{ivided, exclusion-fuII, exclusion-new).2 As before, we tested the independence assumption of the model by using a restricted version of the model whereAnu : Aa".Results of these analyses paralleled results of the ni\OVn on estimates of A in Experiment I; the model fit the data from the direct-retrieval condition exceP tionally well, 62(1) : 0.43, whereas the fit 9f that same airect-'rctievd moAet to the generate'{€coguze condition was pq)r' G1t7 : 2l'61, p < '005' Paramercr estimatcs gco"rated by the direct-rctrieval modelarc shown in AppendirD.
Can we find a model that will fit the data from the generatHecognize condition? To do so, we rearranged the irr"."t"tt ititlt" dit"ct-r"trieval model to more closely ienect operation of a generatHecogniz€ strategy (sce Appendix C). As with the direct-rctrieval model' we attciripted to fit thc genemtFrecognize-model to data from Uotn instructional conditions in Experiments I and 3' The gcneratH€cognize model (Appendix !) contained the same f,aaa-"t"tt as thc direct-retrieval model: R6,1, R6",4611, At", b6", and G"*" h Expcriment I and R1-r, R,m.,,.Aug, Aru.,' G6, and G"r" for Experiment 3. For both experiments' ct : .005, and xLttl : 7.88. For E:rperimcnt 1, analysis of thc restricrcd frrdel whereAnu = Aol" indicatcd a good fit of the model for the generate'+ecognize conditio-n, @(l; = 3'33' but not for the direct-retieval condition, 6P1t; : 13'78, p < .005. tikewisc, for Experiment 3, the rcstricted model wherc Ar-, = Ar', fit the data for ttre generatedecoSnize condition qilL *"[,--cP(l) : 1.41, but did not fit the data for the direct-retricval condition, c:1t1 : 13.43, p < '005' Parametcr cstimates generated by the generate{ecognize model arc shown inAPPcndix D.
Although participants sometines use I generate'{ecog-nize strategy to accomplish cued recall' we have little interest in developing i generate+ecognize model' The assumptions underiying a generat€-recogrizn model arc no less open to violation than arc thosc underlying a directrctrieval model (e.g., Weldon & Colston, 195) ' A generat+ rccognize model (Jacoby & Hollingshead' 1990) rcsts on an indelcndence assumption, although one that is differcnt nom Oe direct-retrieval model. Also, we arc hesitant to adopt a generate{ecognize model because doing so rclies on the assumption that an inclusion test (indhect test) provides a process-purc measure of automatic procesf! (see itre exchange between Jacoby, Toth, Yonelinas, & Debner' llhere were 5,760 obscrvations (48 participants X 120 observationVparticipant) in each instnrctional condition in Exp0riment l' ns in expcriment 3, scparate fits werc obtained for thc directrctricval and generate-*ecognizc instructional conditions' A post hoc powcr analysis was conductcd to obtain values of p and the criti&l value of 12. With w = 0.10, N = 5,76O, c = 0'(X)5, and one degrcc of freedom, -the power analysis yielded I = 0'fi)5 (powcr = .95) and Xi,(l) : 7.88. Joordens & Merikle, 1993) . Most important, our primary inrcrest is in recollection. To satisfy the assumptions of a generatHecognize model, we must attempt to ensure that participants do not use recollection to accomplish cued recall. Instructing participants to engage in recollection for the inclusion test, as done for the direct-retrieval condition, changes the nature of task performance in a way that violates assumptions underlying the generate-recognize model.
Clearly, base-rate differences between the inclusion and exclusion tests cannot be treated merely as reflecting differences in guessing and then "corrected" for guessing by adding an independent guessing parameter to the model. Rather, the retrieval strtegy used by participants determines how "guessing," and other processes, operate within the framework of the model. Adopting a generate-recogruze strategy violates assumptions underlying the processdissociation procedurc, and rcsults cannot be rectified by correciing for guessing.
Conebtions. No correlation at the level of participana was significang and only in the generate-rccognize condition was the correlation at the level of items for Ro6 -Aa6 significant (.28). The rcason that correlations were lower in this cxperiment than in Experiment I may be a result of the fact that a smaller number of participants was tested, and so estimates were based on fewer observations. At both the participant lcvel and the item level, estimates of A were near idcntical for long and short study durations (.59 vs. .58, when bascd on participant means, and .53 vs. .51, when bascd on ircm means). The small correlations observed bctwecn R and A were similar in magnitude and opposite in direction for participants and items, yet estimates gained in the two ways showed the same pattern of rcsults.
Comparisons with results reported by Cunan and Hintznan (1995) . Only in Curran and Hintznan's Experiment 5 did a paradoxical dissociation r€main when the inclusionexclusion proccdure was used and zero scorcs werc dropped. The patrcrn of rcsuls from that cxperiment is strikingly similar to results found for the generatFrecognize condition (sce Tables 1 and 2 ). The significant differcnce in base rate betwecn the inclusion and exclusion tests found in Curran and Hintzrnan's Experiment 5 suggests that their participans rclied on a generate-recognize strategy just as did our participants who were i;rstmcted to do so. The magnitude of the paradoxical dissociation observed in Curran and Hintzman's Experiment 5 is nearly identical to that produced by our generatHcc ogni?E instructions.
Results in the dircct-retrieval condition werc similar to those from Curran and Hintzman's (1995) Experiment 4, showing that increasing study time increased R but left A relatively invariant. Curran and Hintzman (1995) argued that the absencc of a paradoxical dissociation in their Experiment 4 was because participants did not understand exclusion instmctions (but see the exchange between Jacoby, Begg, & Toth, 1997, and Hintzman, 1997 , for debate concerning the criteria that they used to conclude that participants did not understand instructions). There is no evidence to suggest that participants in our experiment did not undentand exclusion instmctions.
General Discussion
The three experiments produced extremely consistent results. Direct-retrieval instructions produced process dissociations, as did direct-retrieval data with the IRK procedure. Decreasing study time reduced recollection but left auto. matic influences almost perfectly invariant (Experiment 2 and 3), just as did dividing attention during study @xperi-ment l; Jacoby et al., 1993; Schminer-Edgecombe, 1996) . When generate*ecogrrize instnrctions were given or generaterecognize performance was mimicked with the IRK procedure, a paradoxical dissociation was poduced by manipulating attention @xperiment l) and by manipulating study time @xperiments 2 and 3)-increases in R were accompanied by a decrcase in A. Paradoxical dissociations result when participants use a generate-{ecogInzs strategy, thereby excluding items that thcy "know" ate old. To meet the assumptions underlying the processdissociation procedure, it is important that instructions encourage participants to exclude items only because they rccollect (rcmember) earlier studying the items.
Effects of Instrucrtons
Becausc of automatic influences of memory rcading a word makes it more likely that the word will later come readily to mind as a completion for a word stem. Clearly, excluding old words because of the fluency with which they came to mind as a completion would violate the independcnce assumption underlying the estimation procedure. Fluency rcflects automatic influenccs of memory and so, as a basis for exclusion, cannot be independent of those influences. Elsewherc, we (e.g., Jacoby, Kelley, & Dywan, 1989) have argued that the feeling of familiarity that can serve as an altemative to recollcction as a basis for recognition memory rcflccts an unconscious attribution process that rclies on a fluency heuristic. Applying those argumcnts, when a generate{€cognizc stratcgy is used or when asked to make rcmembcr-know judgments, we can colrcctly attributc fluency to its source and experience it as familiarity or "knowing," which can be used to exclude old words. However, the attribution prooess is influenced by instnrctions. When a direct-rctrieval strategy is used, the same automatic influences of memory on fluency can be ignored or anributed to differcnces among items and not experienced as familiarity. Fluency of completing a stem is ambiguous in that it does not specify its source. Because of its ambiguity, rcliance on fluency, as a basis for recognition or knowing that is used to exclude old words, rcsults in the exclusion of new words that are fluently produced as completions as well as old words, creating a differcnce in base rate between inclusion and exclusion tests.
Richardson-Klavchn and Gardiner (1996) have suggested that because of involuntary conscious memory, the processdissociation procedure confounds awareness with intention and underestimates automatic influences. Their argument is that old words are sometimes excluded, although they are not intentionally brought to mind by means of recollection but, rather, involuntarily come to rrind as a completion t8 JACOBY fonowed by awareness of their prior study. Important for accuracy of exclusion performance reflects exclusion on the their argument is the question of whether "*"r"n!r, or p.io. basis o? recognition t"lTting familiarity ("know" restudy (recognition memory) is invoruntary. If it is not, ,ponr"rl, ottt"i ttt-exclusion being restricted to the use of exclusion because of involuntary conscious a".r"ry a*i recollection ("rememb€r" responses), as is required to meet not differ from the use of a generate-recognize strategy to "rro.pti,onr'underlying the process-dissociation procedure exclude old words and depends on instmctionr ti"t "r" i'r.d. and roi correct application of *re n'r procedure' MisclassiInvoluntary recognition memory O*, ,oa"ti*o-o""* fying asit"'n"tb"t" words thatparticipants only "know"
(ste-Made & Jacoby, tgg3), but it is yet to u" rtto*n trt"t it rt" ora inflates estimates of R and produces a paradoxical plays a role in oe incrusioi-+xclusion pro""d;"cd;;" dissociation by producing decreases inA with increases in R' & Toth, 1996) . Involuntary conscious -"-ory i * i*,,' -It"* es-timation of automatic influences by using our may seldom occur in the context of intentioni$-"t"t tq SK..pdut" is based on an independence assumption' remember rhe item. Also, cstimatcs would not beionii"n-"""0 Gardiner and his colleagues t":q'' 9T^{39r' 1988; Gardiner by any involuntary *or"i* memory that occun after an A lavi-tqgt; Gardiner & Parkin' 190) have analyzed the old word is given as a completion or, ror ott "r **, ir *t straighi prouauility .of a "know] rcsponse' The choice used as a basis for exclusion Uerween'"pptryrtJt1s important for the finding of dissociaCombining the direct-rctrieval and generate-{ecogruze-ti*t ti""l6', Yonelinas,-& Jennings' 1997; Yonelinas & strategies would allow participants to be morc c"rtaTn of Jacoby, tgg6)' lfte rcmember-know procedurc has most excluding old words tnan wouta the use or "itt ", .t "rcgv often'ueen used in conjunction wittr tests of recognition alone. Using this combined strategy, parti"ipaot, ,no,ib -"-ory*tt"t""tforthelxperimentsrBportedhere'weused attempt to recall an old word by gsin-g the ,t"-'", " cue and, tfre pdedure in combination with cued recall' Recognition if unsuccessful, would then think of a completion that was -"-ow -a cued rccall differ with regard to the dissociasubjected to a voluntary, recognrtion-memory "n""t u"for" tions they rcveal (Jacoby"Yonelinas' & Jennings' 1997)'
being output r" " r"rp.rjor". do air""t-r"fi"val instnrctions Also, our primary intercst has been in separating contribudo not tell participants to us€ a recognition-me.".y "tr*r tions of "oto-^tit and consciously controlled processing'
Rather, participants are told only to cxclude *ora" in"t trr"y whereas Gardiner and his associates approach similar issues recall as ea.ier presented. convergence of rcsutts from thl from a phenomc-nological standpoint (Richardson-Klavehn inclusion+xclusion pJJut" *t=th tho*" from the IRK & Gardiner, 1996)' procedure supports tn" a"i, that use or a rccognition-A cost of dir"gr""-"nt.is that it sometimes overshadows memory check is voluntary ani that participanti given agrcement. We agrce with Gardiner and his colleagues direct-retrieval instmctions are following those instnrctions. ,"g.raiog dr" impJrtance of subjective reports and the utility participants given dircct-rcricval instrirctioo, do oot "ror-te re:memuei-tnow procedure. It should be noted that clude words that they would "know" *"r"-ota-nad they the-corrcspondenc:FryTntheprobabilityof "rcmember" made remember&ow judgments and R as measurca by inclusion+xclusion remains rcgard-
The problems for cstimating automatic influences of less of the assumptibn made about the relation between memory said to be cr€ated by involuntary conscious memory consciously controlled. and automatic processes' Both the arc the same as those produced by participants' use of a remembetikoo* and the proccssdissociation approach regeneratedecoguzc strategy to cxclude ofd-words. The goals iect a uniury view that docs not distinguish different forms of direct-rctrievat instnrcf;ons are to satis$ the assumption or uses of memory' that R is the samc for inclusion and exclurioo t"rb "r *Lu "r The remember-know approach has recently been critito satisfy the independencc assumpti*. W" t*p""t tft"t "A"a Ay tn9wi18 ttrat aiJsociations that it rcveals can be inrcrrrixing the two types of test makcs it morc likely that """ottttttd for b! a single-process model of memory in assumptions will be sihsfrea (cf. Buchner "'Jrg95i. w" combination with signaldetection theory @onaldson' 1996;
recommend that those who want to replicate o,rf r"rrrtt" ur" Hirshman & Mastei' 1997)' Convergence between rcsults our direct-rctrieval instnrctions (Appendix ;i;;d;' from the remember-know and processdissociation procekeeping in mind that participants'-co-r€ct uoO".rt-aing oi dures can be helpful for showing the need to distinguish instnrctions will resufin their cxcluding oory-ilm, o"i"t" between uses or iorms of memory. However, such convcr-*,"u*t a as earrier studied. ' '--"---. :::tr il:"i1##"H*tr;tf:f,::"ff:il"t$:11; Remember-Know and prccess Dissociation ;i:ffffiffi:ffn;ilLTt#fi"fftT#"il:trH::
The paradoxical dissociation prodrrced by grouping i"t;;Jtheirocess-dissociationprocedures'detailsof the "know" responses with "rcmember" *tpoi""";;
;; instntctions that are used are important'
tti"g th" n'k procedure is the same as found when using generare.{pcogruze inrtn "tion, with the inclusion_rxclu-Base_Rate Dffirences as Direct Evidence ii* pto".aut" and is also similar to tle^-Pa:ado.xi:al ofViolatedAssumptions dissociation that Curran and Hintzman (195) found by using their recoffecl ana eictuOe pr*.Aut". fn Jt ttt"tl
The presence of a significant difference in base rates cases, only old words that werc -ir"tar.inJ ", "n"*" between inclusion and exclusion tests can be used as direct would be used as completions on the exclurion t"rt. rtr" t igt evidence that assumptions underlying the estimation proce-dure have been violated. Generate-recognize instructrons produced significant differences in base rates, as did mimicking a generate-recognize strategy with the remember-know procedure. However, a problem for the inclusion<xclusion procedure is that the absence of significant base-rate differences between types of test does not enslue that assumptions underlying the estimation procedure have been met. Curran and Hintzman (1995) found paradoxical disssociations that werc not accompanied by base-rate differences. In their Experiment l, the paradoxical dissociation was eliminated when zcros in cxclusion were dropped, suggesting that the paradoxcial dissociation was caused by floor effects rather than by violation of asssumptions. However, for their Experimcnt 5, dropping zerlo scorcs in exclusion reduced the base-ratc differcncc between inclusion and exclusion tests to the point it was no longer significant but left a paradoxical dissociation. Russo andAndrade (1995) also found paradoxical dissociations that werc not accompanied by significant differcnccs in basc rates. In their experiments, materials were uscd that produced vcry low base rates and exclusion of old words was very near perfect. Even without zero scores, problems are produced for estimating A when performancc is very near floor. At that exEeme, estfunates of A are much morc scnsitive to small differences in exclusion performance.
Paradoxical dissociations sometimes reflect floor effects rather than the violation of assumptions underlying the estimation procedure. The choice betwecn means of dealing with zcro scorcs in exclusion performance is controversial (see Jacoby, Begg, & Toth, 197 , and thc response by Curran & Hint"man, 1997) . Howevcr, it is important that using malerials that produce a higher base rate so as to avoid zero scsres sliminatcs "paradoxical" dissociations that were otherwisc found (c.g., Jacoby et al., 1993) . Also, the use of materials that produce higher base rates is likcly to increase the scnsitivity of base-ratc differcnces to participants'use of a generatH€cognizc sfttegy. When base rates are very low, evcn if participants arc using a generate'-recogruze smtegy, few new words arc likely to come fluently to mind as a completion and to bc mistakenly excluded because of their false recognition, and such mistaken exclusion is necessary to produce significant base-rate differences. We recommend thit investigaton select materials (Appendix A) to produce base rates that are suffrciently high to avoid zeros in exclusion. However, even when higber base rates are used, participans' reliance on a generate-recognize strategy might not always produce a significant base-rate differcnce.
Prccess Dissociation and Multinomial Models: C one cting for B as e -Rat e Dffi renc e s Buchner et al. (1995) advanced an "extended measurement model" for the process-dissociation procedure that was said to have the advantage of taking base-rate differences in guessing into account. The results rcported here provide reasons for caution when using such a model. The difficulty is that base-rate differences may not simply reflect differences in guessing but, rather, reflect a difference in ways the task is being accomplished. When generate-recognize instructions were given, use of a multinomial model did not correct for base-rate differences in a way that eliminated the paradoxical dissociation that was produced.
Using a multinomial model does have some potential advantages as a means of analyzing data. For example, it makes it clear that we are testing a model and helps rebut claims to the contrary (e.g., Hillstrom & Logan, 1997 : Richardson-Klavehn et al., 1996 . However, as a general class, multinomial models allow a large variety of different assumptions and are atheoretical, providing only a means of describing data @atchelder & Riefer, 1990) . By the processdissociation approach, in contast, we usc thcory to makc an explicit assumption about the relation betwecn processcs' to design conditions, and to make predictions meant to test our assumptions. For example, prctcess dissociations showing effects on R in combination with rclativc invariance of A should be consistently found only if R and A are independcnt.
We have developed instmctions and cxperincntal proccdures that are meant to avoid base-rate differcnccs betwcen inclusion and exclusion tests. If base rates do not differ and one's intercst is in dissociations, a model of response bias is unnecessary. A disadvantage of the multinomial approach is that investigaton may be mislcd to bclieve that thc multine mial model provides a statistical means of accomplishing equal base rates, making it unneccssary to avoid basc-rate differences by design. Yonelinas and Jacoby (1996) provided a more complete discussion of the relation betwecn multinomial modcls and thc processdissociation approach and argued for the advantages of avoiding base-rate differences.
Can Correlations Be Used as Direct Evidence of Volate d As s umptions ? Curran and Hintzrnan (1995) interprcrcd findings of a positive correlation betwecn R and A at the lcvel of ircms as direct evidence that the independence assumption underlying the processdissociation proccdure was invalid-Becausc of the positive corrclation bctwcen R andA, the underestimation of A was said to increase with increascs in R an4 thereby, produce a paradoxical dissociation ' Curran and Hintzman (1997) stressed the importancc of thc correlation between R66 and A* at the level of ircms as suggcsting that correlation at the level of items reflects "common dcterminants of lexical access" (p. 501). Hintzrnan and Curran (1997, p. 512) starcd that correlations acnoss subjccts and correlations across items are of no rclevancc to the unobservable conelation that measurcs prcc€ss dependencc but are "direct evidence" that the correlation rcsponsible for aggregation bias is unlikely to be zero and serve as a waming that "the possibility of underestimation should not be ignored."
In our experiments, the correlation between Ra6 and A* never approached significance in ttre direct-retrieval conditions, and so lexical access cannot bc crcdited as the source of the correlation at the item level in those conditions. Rather, the correlation between Ro6 andAa6 at the item level in direct-retrieval conditions might hqve been produced by the estimation procedure itself. Aggregating across partici-pants to compute item-level means should produce overestimation of A, rather than underestimation, because of the invene correlation at the participant level. If it is to be held that observed correlations between estimates serve as direct evidence that aggregation bias played a role in rcsults found with direct-retrieval instructions, it must be explained why results were the same regardless of whether item-based or participant-based estimates were used, although effects of aggregation bias should be opposite for the two types of estimate. Curran and Hintzman's (1995) Experiment 4 also showed effects on R but relative invariance in A for both item-based and participant-based means, although the corrclation between R and A was positive at the item level and inverse at the.participant level.
Results are consistent with Jacoby and Shrout's (197) conclusion that observed corrclations at the itcm or participant level cannot be used to dircctly test process dependence or to infer the unobservable correlations responsible for aggregation bias. The observed correlations do not allow the prcdiction of whether a paradoxical dissociation will be found. When the expcriments avoided zeros in cxclusion and used direct-retrieval instmctions or mimickcd use of a direct-rctrieval strategy with the rcmembcr-know procedure, there were no paradoxical dissociations left to be explained, but significant correlations were still found. Corrclations at the item level were nearly as large in the direct-retrieval conditions as in the generate-*ccogxr7z conditions, although a paradoxical dissociation was found only in the latter conditions. A significant correlation at the level of items between Ro6 and A* was found only for generate-rccognize results @xperiments I and 3). However, comparisons across our rcsults and those of Curran and Hintzman (1995, Experiment 4) show that, with or without a significant corrclation of Ro6 and A** at the level of items, it is possible to find an incrcase in R along with rclative invariance ofA (i.e., an absence of a paradoxical dissociation).3 A significant corrclation between R and A at the level of participans was not found when generate-recognize instructions were used, providing empirical evidence that joins Jacoby and Shrout's (197) psychometric analysis to show that the significance of that corrclation cannot serve as a direct test of whether or not participants werc using a generat€-rcc ogrnzg smtegy.
Hintzman and Curran (197) said, "We think it is unlikely that subjects in processdissociation experiments on wordstem completion can be prcvenrcd from using a generaterecognize smtegy at least some of the time" (p. 513). Curran and Hintzman (1995) interpreted the inverse corrclation between R and A at the level of participants as evidence that participans relied on a generate-recognize strategy. However, Hintzman and Curran agreed with Jacoby and Shrout (1997) that correlation at the participant or item level cannot be used to test process dependence such as that produced by participants'reliance on a gcnerate{€coguze strategy. If participants in our direct-retrieval conditions did sometimes use a generate-recogruze strateg/, their doing so was not sufficient to produce a paradoxical dissociation. To argue that the independence assumption was violarcd in a way that produced either process dependence or aggregation bias, one has to argue that, in some mysterious way, participants' misunderstanding of instructions or a tnre effect of the manipulated variable on A consistently senred to offset near perfectly the effect of violation of independence, regardless of whether itemlevel or participant-level means were examined. We believe it is more likely that participants understood and followed instructions in the direct-rctrieval conditions than *rat such delicate balances between offsetting effects can be routinely found.
Understanding of corrclations between R and A, at whatever level, requires a thorough psychometric analysis along with identification of the many potential sources of correlation, including the contribution of the estimation procedurc itself (Jacoby & Shrout, 1997) . We are not tcmptcd to try to interpret significant correlations that were found becausc of the potential contribution of the estimation proccdurc as well as that of other souroes of correlation that have not yet bcen identified. Correlations found in thc generato-recognize conditions are particularly difEcult to interprct because of violations of assumptions underlying the proccssdssociation procedurc. However, if one is interested in individud differences, it is important to gain a bet0er undentanding of the sources of correlation that are rcsponsible for the significant corrclations observed in the direct-retrieval conditions. Those corrclations cannot be used to directly test assumptions underlying the processdissociation proccdurc but are sufficiently high to warrant their further investigation.
The P roc ess -Dis sociation Approach : Limits and Future Directions
Results from the direct-retricval conditions coverge with a grcat deal of other cvidence to suggest ttrat it is possible to satisfy the independence assumption underlying the processdissociation procedure (Jacoby, Yonelinas, & Jennings, 1997) . Hay and Jacoby (196) created conditions necessary to apply the processdissociation proccdure by varying the rclation between materid that was to be rcmembered and prior knowledge rather than by use of inclusion<xclusion instnrctions. Doing so avoids many potential pmblems, such as difrercnces in base rate, and produccs the same pattern of rcsults as does the inclusion<xclusion proccdure. Ratcliff and McKoon (1997) presented a countermodel that describes cffects of implicit memory on perceptual perforrnance (e.g., Jacoby & Dallas, 1981) as producei by bias. We (Jacoby, McElree, & Trainham, in prcss) have shown that results reported by Ratcliff and McKoon, when reanalyzed, rcveal striking process dissociations that are the same as found by Hay and Jacoby (1996) . The countermodel provides a description of a more complete informationprocessing model that is compatible with the process3It is unclear why a significant correlation between Ra6 and A* was found in Curan and Hintzman's (195) Experiment 4 but was not found in the direct-retrieval condition in our experimentsl However, to prove that correlation provides a direct test of the independence assumption rcquires showing that the correlation could not have ariscn from some other source, including agpgation, which we believe is impossible to accomplish. dissociation approach and provides exciting new directions for research.
Results described above, along with those from experiments rcported herc, should be sufficient to discourage abandoning the processdissociation approach. We continue to be impressed by results obtained by using the inclusionexclusion procedure when the boundary conditions specified by Jacoby et al. (1993) are met. When zeros in exclusion are avoided and dirpct retrieval is encouraged, process dissociations showing effects on R accompanied by near perfect invariance in A arc consistently found. Howcver, on the negative side, details of instnrctions serve as an important boundary condition for findings, and there is no fully rcliable means of directly testing assumptions underlying the estimation procedure. We sce those problems as a challenge to further rcfine proccdurcs and to cxplore boundary conditions rather than as naasons to abandon the goal of separating the contributions of automatic and controlled prooesses.
Even if the assumptions of the process-dissociation procedurc hold across only a vcry limitcd range of conditions, the procedure might still be useful for diagnosis and the design of tncatments for deficits in memory (Jacoby, Jennings, & Hay, 196) . It is deficits in recollection that we find most intcrcsting and seek to mcasurc by arranging situations such that participants rcly on a direct-rctrieval shategy rather than on a generato-recognize strategy. The assumption made about the relation betwecn automatic and controlled processes is important for attempts to remediate memory deficits. Supposc that because of a severe memory deficit' a person was unable to correctly answer a question about what was caten for brealfast. A direct-rctrieval approach to rehabilitation would cncourage an attcmpt to rain rccollection. For examplc, the retention interval might be varied and the pcrson trained to better constrain rctrieval by attcmpting to r€construct contcxl In contrast, a generato-recognize approach would cncourage the penon suffering a memory dehcit to let an answer automatically come to mind and then carefully inspcct the potcntial answer to be absolutely certain that is was recognizcd as correct before giving it as a response. The generatHecognizc approach might sometimes be effective but seems unattractive. As those who have had critics know, inspccting one's answer to be absolutely certain that it is corr@t before gving it as a rcsponse can producc overvigilancc that is extnemely unpleasant and can be counterproductive. Fof memory perforrnnce, as well as for theorizing about memory mistaken cxclusion poduced by overvigilanoe can be far more problematic than the failures to exclude that the gealer vigilance was meant to eliminate. Note. Base rates for oN = ontario, Tx : T.**. Ther" *"r" gnll 32 obser"ations in the Texas bas€ rates, whereas the base rates for ontario have been accumulated over-many ""p"#;;."#;i'i+6;.;;tFu"rJ on Thorndike & L,orge (1944) ; A and AA are
[:l-l*;:X"tl*n:'*?#il"t"TJ331,#tllm; (no prurars or proper names) ror the stems that have actualrv been given bv participants (rather than dictionary set sizc)' Appendix B
Test Instmctions for Experiments I and2
Experiment I : DirecfRetrieval Instmctions for Inclusion-Exclusion Intermixed
In this part of the experiment" you will be presentcd with word stems, that is, the fint three letten of a 5-letter word. You arc to us€ the word st€nrs as cucs for recall of words tbat werc carlicr prescnted in cither of the lists you just read. For cxamplc, thc word slime was in one of thc lists you just rcsd. In the tcst phasc, thc word stcm sli--would be prescntcd as a cuc for recall of slime. Howevcr, not all the stcms that will be prescntcd can bc complcted with an eorlier-prescnted word an4 so, recall of an eadierprescnted word will not always bc possible. If you arc unablc to recall a word, you arc to completc thc stcm with thc first S-lctrcr word that comcs to mind that fits thc stcm. No plurals or propcr namcs ane allowcd as completions.
This next part of the instructions is spcc.ific to cascs in which you are able to recall an earlier-prcscntcd word that csn bc uscd as a complction for a stem. pe1 sanmple, supposc that givcn tbc stcm slr'--you were able to r€call that the word slirac was prescntcd carlisr. Whethcr you 8rr to usc that r€cdlcd word as a complction dcpends on thc typc of tcst item y<xr ue given. Somc of the stcms will bc prescntcd wittr the prompt ald For thosc tcst itcms, you arc to usc your r€callcd word as a completion. Other stcms will be prescntcd with the prompt ncu For tbosc ttst itcms, you arc not to usc your recallcd word as a completion. Rathcr, you arc to completc thosc stems with a word difrcrent from your rccallcd word. Givcn new sli--,yon would not say "slime" bu! rather, would givc somc othcr word such as "slicc" as a complction for thc stcm. It will eomctimcs happen that you can recall an carlier-p,rescntcd word but camot think of a different complction for the stcm-In thosc cases, sinply leave thc stem blank. ln summary, you will be givcn Etcms to usc as cucs for recall of words that wcrc prescnted carlier. If you 8r€ able to recall a geviously prescntcd wond, you arc to usc that r€callcd word as a completion if thc stem is accompanicd by thc prompt old Howcvcr, if the stcm is accompanicd by thc prompt ,Ew, ycl.t arc not to usc s recallcd word as a complction. It will somctimcs happcn that you arp unablc tio rcc8ll an carlier-p,rescntcd word that would completc the stcm. This is ccrtain to bc thc casc bccausc some of thc stcms can only bc completcd with words that wcre not carlicr strdicd. Whcn you are unable to recall an carlicr-prescntcd wond, complctc the stcm with thc first word that comcs to mind regardlcss of whether the stcm is accompanicd by thc prompt old or t}rc prcmpt ncw. Try to complctc as nrany stcms 8s possible. Howcver, rcmember it is important that you try to usc rccallcd words to complcte stems accompanied by oA and to not usc recallcd words to complete stcms accompanicd by ruw. You will havc 15 s to complcte each stem. If you have not cornpletcd the stcm within 15 s, the program will simply go on to the next trial. Just givc your rcsponse out loud. The next part of the experiment involvcs a word-stcm completion task. You will be presented with the first three lettcrs of a 5-lctter word, and your task is to complete the word. Somc of the stems can be completed with words presented earlier in one of the lists you just rcad. However, other stems can be completed only with new words, that is, words that were not earlier presented. No plurals or proper names are allowed as completions.
What we are interested in is seeing whether people can avoid using the earlier-prcsented words when completing stems. Therefore, when a completion word comes to mind, you should not just say the word. Insrcad, you should check your memory to be sure that the completion word that has come to mind is not one of the words that was prcscnted earlier. If it is, you ar€ to complete the stem with a diffcrcnt word.--fie that was not earlier prcsented. It is important that you not give an carlier-presented word. If your completion word sccrns at all familiar, don't give it" but rather think of a differcnt word. If you cannot think of a difrerent completion, just leave thc stem blank. It is bctt€r to leave the stcm blank. than to usc an earlicr-prcsentcd word.
You will have 15 s to completc cach stem. After 15 s, the computer will simply go on to the next trial. So remembcr, it is okay to lct the time run out rather than complete a stcm with a word /ou think may have bccn prescntcd carlier. Use the time to try to rhink of a difrerent completion-all the stems have multiple complctions so thinking of a difrercnt word should be possible. But if you can't think of a different word, don't be tempted to use the carlier-prescnted word----remember we are tying to see if people can avoid using thc carlier-prcsented words. So stop and check cach word bcforc you give it as a rcsponse.
Inclusion Test Instructions
The following tcst is again a word-stem completion task in which some of the srcms can be completed with earlier-prcsented study words and some only with new words. Howcver, this time, wc want to sce how quickly you can complete the stems without worrying about whether your completion word was prcscnted earlicr or not Therefore, your task is to complerc the stem as fast as you can with the frst 5-letter word that comes to mind that fits the stem, without worrying about whether the word was prcscnted carlier or not. Don't try to usc memory because doing so will just generally slow you down. Rather, just complete the stem with the fint word that comcs to mind, doing so as rapidly as possible. you will have 15 s to complete each stem. After l5 s, the computer will simply go into the next trial. Again, no plurals or proper names are allowed as completions.
Experiment 2: Direct-Retrieval Instructions for Remember-Know
The next part of the experiment involves a word-stem completion task. You will be presented with the first thre€ letters of a S-letter word and your task is to complete the word. your task is to use each stem as a cue to help you recall a word that was prcsented carlier in the experiment in either of the lists and to use thit word as the completion for the stem. If you cannot recall an earlierprcsented word, use the first word that comes to mind that completes the word stem. Plurals and proper names are not allowed.
After you have completed each word stem, your task is to decide whether each word is one you remember was presented earlier in the experiment, know was presented earlier in the experiment, or is new-that is, wasn't presented earlier in the experiment. You are to respond that you "remembcr" a word as earlier presented if you consciously remember the circumstances under which you encountered the word earlier in the experiment. As an example, the word might bring back something you experienced when it was earlier prcsented, such as an image, or some personal significance of the word that you thought of when it was presented. You might remembcr the way it looked on the screen. In any of these cases, you should say "rcmember."
"Know" means that you know for a fact that the word was pr€scntcd earlier in the cxperiment even though you don't remember any details about it The word is just familiar in the cxperimental context. This is similar to seeing someone on the street, being aware that you know them, but being unable to establish any details about where you know them from. If you know the word was presented earlier in the experiment, but can't think of any details about it, say "know."
"New" means the word did not appear in either of the liss in the first part of the experiment. If the word is new, say "new."
So to summarize: You arc to use the stem as a cue to help you recall an earlier-presented word. If you arc unable to recall an earlier-presented word, completc the stem with the first word that comes to mind. You will have 15 s to complete each stem. After 15 s, the computer will simply go on to the next trial. After you have complcted the stem, tell me whether the completion word is one you "remember," "know," or "ncw."
Tcst itcm and paramctcr
